Iran's new president,
Hassan Rouhani, has come across as strongly critical of his country's
current trajectory at home and abroad. Photograph: Corbis
Amid the storm clouds thickening and darkening over Syria, there was one shaft of sunlight at the weekend: the election of a moderate cleric as Iran's president. Whether it is because of the west's bungled intervention in Iraq, or simply the law of unintended consequences, Iran's
influence has indisputably grown. Today its decisions affect Arab lives
from the Mediterranean to the Euphrates, from the Turkish border to the
Gulf. Of all the options available to the US in trying to roll back
this power – punitive sanctions, military confrontation or arming the
Gulf states – negotiation is still the most attractive. In Hassan Rouhani, a partner for negotiation may have finally arrived.
This is about more than one man – the way he came to power matters, too. To take one small snapshot, Qom, a city full of clerics, voted for him, not against. To have Qom vote against the five regime candidates left in the race, defying the will of the guardian council who vetted them, sends a powerful signal in its own right. Mr Rouhani's warning that Iran's stand over nuclear fuel must not come at the cost of its economy plainly won the backing of a broad swath of Iranian opinion, transcending conservative and reformist camps. In 2009, Iran's nuclear policy was not centre stage of the election campaign; this weekend it was. This alone should put the ultra-conservative group around the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, on the defensive.
Mr Rouhani's victory also showed that the reformist camp had learned the lessons of the stolen election in 2009. The two reformist leaders backing him, Mohammad Khatami and Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, showed their hand for Mr Rouhani only at the eleventh hour. This took skill. Until then, the regime had no idea who really lay behind his candidacy. Mr Rafsanjani and Mr Khatami did not go for the most outspoken reformist in the race. By persuading Mohammad-Reza Aref to stand down, they showed the reformists could play Iranian politics. Since the crackdown which followed the election of 2009, they have lowered their expectations, deciding that small steps forwards are better than large steps backward.
The character of Iran's new president also matters. Unlike his confrontational predecessor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Mr Rouhani is a consensus builder. He is a seasoned diplomat who knows the west. Under him, Iran suspended enrichment and allowed international inspectors in. Full suspension of the uranium-spinning centrifuges is unlikely to be repeated, and the west must understand that much power still lies in the hands of Mr Khamenei and Iran's Revolutionary Guards.
Mr Rouhani clearly represents an opportunity to unwind Iran's ticking nuclear clock. But the US and its allies must also learn important lessons from years of stalemate. The draconian sanctions need to be reversible: for Mr Rouhani to be able to make concessions, he must be able to go back to his people with tangible economic gains. Iran's sovereignty must be respected, including that which relates to properly monitored civil nuclear power, and it must also be engaged in a growing non-nuclear agenda, principally Syria.
The clearest indication of that came not from the wary G8 leaders assembled yesterday, but from Cairo. President Mohamed Morsi cut diplomatic relations with Damascus, while calling both for Hezbollah to leave Syria and for a no-fly zone. The man who tried and failed to convene a conference including Iran and Saudi Arabia was expressing his frustration with Shia-led attacks on Sunni Muslims. Before Sunni jihadis start flocking into Syria, Iran must realise what is at stake – and back down. Posing as a champion of the Shia is one thing; fighting a war with Sunni Arabs is another – and it is not a fight Iran will win.
Russia cannot be counted as an intermediary on Iran. Vladimir Putin has not got the strategic vision to do that in his current mood. Few other countries have got the clout. Thus it is only America which can engage Iran. If it does so, Barack Obama's prematurely outstretched hand might finally find a recipient.
This is about more than one man – the way he came to power matters, too. To take one small snapshot, Qom, a city full of clerics, voted for him, not against. To have Qom vote against the five regime candidates left in the race, defying the will of the guardian council who vetted them, sends a powerful signal in its own right. Mr Rouhani's warning that Iran's stand over nuclear fuel must not come at the cost of its economy plainly won the backing of a broad swath of Iranian opinion, transcending conservative and reformist camps. In 2009, Iran's nuclear policy was not centre stage of the election campaign; this weekend it was. This alone should put the ultra-conservative group around the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, on the defensive.
Mr Rouhani's victory also showed that the reformist camp had learned the lessons of the stolen election in 2009. The two reformist leaders backing him, Mohammad Khatami and Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, showed their hand for Mr Rouhani only at the eleventh hour. This took skill. Until then, the regime had no idea who really lay behind his candidacy. Mr Rafsanjani and Mr Khatami did not go for the most outspoken reformist in the race. By persuading Mohammad-Reza Aref to stand down, they showed the reformists could play Iranian politics. Since the crackdown which followed the election of 2009, they have lowered their expectations, deciding that small steps forwards are better than large steps backward.
The character of Iran's new president also matters. Unlike his confrontational predecessor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Mr Rouhani is a consensus builder. He is a seasoned diplomat who knows the west. Under him, Iran suspended enrichment and allowed international inspectors in. Full suspension of the uranium-spinning centrifuges is unlikely to be repeated, and the west must understand that much power still lies in the hands of Mr Khamenei and Iran's Revolutionary Guards.
Mr Rouhani clearly represents an opportunity to unwind Iran's ticking nuclear clock. But the US and its allies must also learn important lessons from years of stalemate. The draconian sanctions need to be reversible: for Mr Rouhani to be able to make concessions, he must be able to go back to his people with tangible economic gains. Iran's sovereignty must be respected, including that which relates to properly monitored civil nuclear power, and it must also be engaged in a growing non-nuclear agenda, principally Syria.
The clearest indication of that came not from the wary G8 leaders assembled yesterday, but from Cairo. President Mohamed Morsi cut diplomatic relations with Damascus, while calling both for Hezbollah to leave Syria and for a no-fly zone. The man who tried and failed to convene a conference including Iran and Saudi Arabia was expressing his frustration with Shia-led attacks on Sunni Muslims. Before Sunni jihadis start flocking into Syria, Iran must realise what is at stake – and back down. Posing as a champion of the Shia is one thing; fighting a war with Sunni Arabs is another – and it is not a fight Iran will win.
Russia cannot be counted as an intermediary on Iran. Vladimir Putin has not got the strategic vision to do that in his current mood. Few other countries have got the clout. Thus it is only America which can engage Iran. If it does so, Barack Obama's prematurely outstretched hand might finally find a recipient.
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